I don’t disagree that identity remains politically powerful, and that newer identities (gender, nation, culture) have become central. But the form and function of identity in politics has changed profoundly in the neoliberal era, accelerated by the incentives of social media.
For sure they are less anchored in meso-institutions and intermediary associations. But these make them more, not less, powerful factors in the dynamics of politics, precisely because they are unachored and 'up for grabs' by smart political entrepreneurs, as illustrated by Hooghe and Marks.
I'm approaching this from the perspective of democratic participation, not just political volatility or salience. The fact that identities are up for grabs may make them exploitable, but that doesn't mean they strengthen democracy.
But that identities do or should strengthen democracy is a normative starting assumption I am not sure I share. it's meso-organisations that structure participation & strengthen democracy; collective identities contribute to democracy insofar they strengthen those organisations, not per se. 1/2
Per se, collective identities are problematic for democracies because they set boundaries between insiders & outsiders, modulate solidarity, and socialise individuals into confrontational politics. I'd argue that their positive role through meso organisations is the exception & not the rule.
I agree that identity alone doesn’t guarantee democratic outcomes. But I’d push back against the idea that collective identities are inherently corrosive. Structured conflict has often been a key engine of democratic expansion, not a threat to it.
The civil rights movement, labour struggles, feminist organising, these were identity-based counterpublics. They challenged exclusion through confrontation, but also through institution-building. For me, healthy counterpublics are essential for functional democracies.
Indeed, but these were (1) relatively minoritarian, (2) quite structured, and (3) qualitatively "liberal" (not in the political colour sense but in the sense that they aimed at expanding their rights; nonexclusive. Today's identities are usually framed as zero sum; content matters. 1/2.
2/2 moreover, the lack of structuring exposes them to top-down populist activation. And finally, even those 'positive' examples contained quite a bit of exclusionary politics in their more extreme fringes.
Yes, I’d say we’re describing different phases of the same story. Those earlier counterpublics were structured, expansive, and often deeply rooted in civic institutions. What we’ve lost is the capacity to sustain that kind of political identity today.
The shift toward zero-sum, reactive identity isn’t accidental. It emerges from a system that has eroded organising spaces, defunded civic infrastructure, and reduced politics to performance and perception. That’s the vacuum I’m focused on.
When identities are disembedded from institutions, they lose the structures that enable collective agency. They're more easily captured by political entrepreneurs precisely because they lack internal organisation, accountability, or deliberative grounding.
That volatility produces mobilisation, but often without direction, structure, and durable power. It's influence without empowerment and visibility without voice. That’s the democratic hollowing I’m describing.
We’ve shifted from embedded collective identities, tied to unions, churches, parties, and movements, to disembedded, affective identities, often shaped through individual experience and online discourse
These new identities are meaningful, but they’re often reactive, fragmented, and mediated by platforms designed for performance, not organisation. They generate affective polarisation, but not sustained leverage over power structures.
So while identity politics is loud and visible, the organisational structures that once enabled collective identities to function as counterpublics, capable of shaping agendas and forcing change, have been hollowed out.
What we’re left with is identity as expression, not identity as strategic organising. That’s the terrain neoliberalism helped create, one where politics is deeply felt, highly polarised, but structurally disempowered.