1️⃣Implementing proposed instruments forcefully. As the CID remains vague, it will be crucial that the EU is bold when deciding the specifics of its industrial policy tools. In the paper, I illustrate this with lead markets, state aid rules (opex subsidies!) and EV purchasing schemes. (13/n)

2️⃣Widening the coverage of sector-specific policies to additional key industries For key industries, COM should develop additional sector-specific strategies - e.g. for batteries and wind, as well as for energy-intensive industries such as paper and cement etc (i.e. NACE 17 & 23). (14/n)

3️⃣ Increasing speed of implementation Doing industrial policy is complicated, and rushing it has risks – but so too does being slow. One example: The first EU lead market strategy is from 2008 (!). We can't wait untill 2030 for the public procurement revision to be implemented to get them. (15/n)

4️⃣Being explicit about what EU industrial policies can realistically deliver This requires, first, that COM provide more clarity on who does what - EU-level, member states, and the private sector. Hydrogen subsidies are a good example (explained in the paper) for why this needs improvement. (16/n)

The Commission should also be more explicit about the limits of industrial policies. For instance, the 40% domestic manufacturing objective set out in the NZIA is neither realistic nor desirable for solar PV anymore - let's be clearer about this. More examples in the paper. (17/n)

🏁 An ambitious implementation of the CID is essential for EU competitiveness, sovereignty and climate objectives. The good news: the EU can still get this right. But for this, CID implementation must match the scale and urgency of the challenges faced by EU clean industries (18/18)

here the paper: www.delorscentre.eu/en/publicati...

and if you are in Berlin next Thursday, come discuss these findings with us at our EU to go: www.delorscentre.eu/de/veranstal...