The problem with conversation is that there are no objective criteria on what course to take in the end. There aren’t even objective criteria for what’s important. Heavyweights tried in the past - and gave up. From. R. Crawshay-Williams, “Russell Remembered”:
But thought it was worthwhile for four years. Many ideas were not ripe for their time, maybe this is something we should start again because this time could do with some structured discussions.
Maybe. But we should definitely do something differently this time.
Or even objective criteria for science! (Probably should stop doing science, really. Clearly not worth much if there isn't one.)
But Daston and Galison show that objectivity isn’t some timeless ideal but a historically constructed and contingent concept. You’re asking for a timeless ideal that would work in every situation and that just isn’t possible, which shows that very disconnect between philosophers and scientists.
If philosophers dictated how science should proceed through some objective criteria, that would stifle breakthroughs that would inherently need to break away from that system.
They should award grants with a prize wheel imho.
Feyerabend would likely have approved
I am not asking for any timeless ideal, but for things most people can agree upon and build on. Historically, scientists have done quite well in that regard. Yes, ideas have been disputed, but many were subsequently resolved – because of a shared idea of what it means to resolve them.
Ok but there will be instances where people don’t agree on what steps to take going forward, such as with the introduction of a brand new technology. At that point it can be those who study how science works to offer one possible path for how to integrate it.
Scientists will judge any new technology on what it enables them to do, or do better, in their work and how - because, in the end, that is how science works. If somebody suggests to me how to do things better, or to avoid pitfalls, it must be better in a way that is relevant to me and my colleagues.
I don’t think anyone is saying scientists *must* adopt the position of this paper. Philosophers aren’t coming down from atop their proverbial perches to tell the lowly pleb scientists how to do their work. It’s just their suggestions. Do with it what you will
I agree. I am just disagreeing, based on historical data, with the claim that philosophers of science have special insight or skills that will make scientists do science better.
I am more interested in philosophy of science and read more on it than (conservative estimate) 95% of my colleagues, and I just see no evidence that it puts them at any disadvantage as scientists relative to myself. Many are thoughtful and brilliant scientists, who excel at spotting problems.
So what would have needed to be changed about the convenience AI paper? That seems like a fairly specific category they’re defining
Nothing. I tend to agree with most of it. But it is in essence an opinion piece - well written and referenced, but still. It implies that there are intrinsically better and worse ways of doing science, and that AI will encourage worse ways. Other philosophers might argue the opposite just as well.
I think the argument is much more specific in that they’re saying that the selling point of AI—it’s ability to make certain tasks convenient—fosters an uncritical use of AI over time that can lead to significant issues in conducting research.
Who will recognise those issues and their consequences when they occur? Historically, it's the people with the domain knowledge, not philosophers. Uncritical use of AI is not unlike uncritical use of statistical methods by those who don't understand them well - there's peer review/feedback for that.
Sure but to use a medical analogy peer review is like curative medicine while this paper is more like preventative medicine. There’s space for both here. There isn’t One True Way to do science or to be mindful of AI use in research
In the long run, peer review is also curative. You learn things for the future from it and learn when it is necessary to ask for help from knowledgeable colleagues before planning, let alone submitting your next work.
Yeah I’m thinking back to nate silvers tweet yesterday about how journalists would be better scientific peer reviewers than scientists, which no, but this paper doesn’t seem like it’s trying to do that. Just start thinking through guardrails.
A basic requirement for a sensible peer review is that reviewer 1) knows enough to understand the basic idea; 2) is aware what they do not understand (they do not have to understand everything); 3) is able to follow the arguments in response to reviewers. Most journalists would fail all three.
I agree there prob could be a little more analysis but at the same time there’s not really a problem with a critical account. I had an old school PI who had us make our reagents (that were easily purchasable) from scratch bc people no longer understood how they were made & why (and it was cheaper)
It 100% made the science more clearer but it was also a massive waste of time after the first few times and caused more delays and headaches and possible inaccuracies and inconsistencies of students running around trying to make things last minute and squeeze the last drop out of some reagent that
Hadn’t been reordered. So I get the kind of it’s sometimes hard for scientists to see themselves in the description of “just doing stuff for convenience” but at the same time I don’t see why there’s not a place for some critical analysis.
Yeah I don’t mean to suggest technologies of convenience are inherently bad or anything like that and I don’t think this paper is doing that either. But it is already established that uncritically using LLMs and the like can have negative consequences for the users critical thinking skills
And sometimes it may be hard to see that taking place as you’re in the middle of doing your research and trying to get published and writing a grant proposal and managing a lab and all those other things that make convenient tech like AI all the more attractive
In the end, scientist themselves will decide which future research papers are interesting based on what they themselves can build on, and spot problems caused by overreliance on AI, just like they historically spotted problems with overreliance on other approaches.
A big issue is the training of future scientists. AI can be used to make it easier for them to learn (which is good) or to make it easier for them to avoid learning (which is bad). With today's students, the latter is becoming a MASSIVE problem, calling for big changes in how learning is assessed.
When presented with evidence that applied philosophy of science currently occurs, it seems beside the point that some philosophers in the past (yes, even 'heavyweights') couldn't do the 'applied' part; ie couldn't speak to questions relevant to scientists. In addition, /1
“Applied philosophy of science” has always occurred in science - with or without philosophers. Scientists have always thought about what they did, on multiple levels. The evidence that they need external help, or that external help historically made a critical difference, is a bit stretched.
I would agree that 'applied philosophy of science' can be done by scientists. The point here is definitely not to denigrate scientists as 'thoughtless', but to argue that sometimes the specific tool-set in which philosophers are trained can be, and has been, relevant to scientific practice.
I'm not sure what 'evidence' you're referring to?
I assume that claims like “Philosophers/philosophy of science can offer concrete tools for academic research (in science)” is based on some concrete evidence and historical examples. If not, what is it based on? Conviction that it is self-evident?
Vedanta and Schrödinger
Even if he was "inspired" by it when working on wave mechanics, and not retroffited it in his later reminiscences (which is common), it was a set of poetic analogies rather than anything that could pass as a serious philosophical argument. That's not what Carl or philosophers of science had in mind.
Mach and Einstein ?
Could you provide some instances where any of Einstein's classic papers cited a philosopher or a work of philosophy? (I tried and failed). Mach was both a philosopher and physicist. Was his actual physics better for it? From "The Search" (1934) by C.P. Snow (of the "Two Cultures" fame).
Not conviction that it's self-evident. There have been, and continue to be, philosophers and scientists actively collaborating on projects. I want to make clear, though, that I don't think you'd want constant philosophical involvement in all parts/areas of scientific research. Also, ...
it is understandable that scientists can be incredulous about philosophical involvement. For one, some attempts at applied philosophy of science by philosophers are truly dire.
Philosophers/philosophers of science can point out logical contradictions and fallacies about how science or reality works, thereby greatly reducing the search space for viable scientific discoveries.
Give me an example where they have done it.
"The homunculus argument is an informal fallacy whereby a concept is explained in terms of the concept itself, recursively, without first defining or explaining the original concept. This fallacy arises most commonly in the theory of vision."
Here is an example in the wild where a man argues that LLMs are the path to AGI due to ignorance of philosophy of mind.
If you accept Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions, it was always nonsensical to expect LLM hallucinations to be inevitably fixed in later chatbot product versions, as if these were minor programming bugs to be ironed out when given a bit more time for engineering work.
This makes no sense at all... Plus, even Kuhn did not accept how most philosophers interpreted his account of scientific revolutions ;)
I think an emphasis on a putative need for 'objective criteria' is also off-the-mark. If philosophy can clarify some of the conceptual, logical and ethical issues at play in a particular scientific query, that can help decision-making. /end
“Clarify” is probably one of the most unclear concepts that philosophers use to describe what they do. It can mean anything and lacks broadly accepted criteria for what it means to successfully clarify something. I recommend bingweb.binghamton.edu/~dietrich/Pa... - quite relevant for your claims.
Re your link, you will probably not be surprised to hear that other philosophers take different views on the question of whether there is progress in philosophy, and if so what form it takes (spoiler alert: not the form that progress in science takes). But it seems quite easy to say that...
Exactly, they take different views, with no resolution. Even the most unsavoury ideas and history came with support by some philosopher or another. Hardly a recommendation for being the right ones to clarify issues, let alone help resolve them…
You very understandably come at this from the perspective of 'if philosophy can't find the one right answer, what use is philosophy'? But we're looking at different scales here. It's not a question of finding the 'right' answer to a big philosophical question; there are smaller tasks to which ...
No, that is not my perspective. I am just pointing out that that perspective is implicit in some of the claims thrown around here, and when I do, there is always a retreat to “clarification” and pluri-perspectivism - which offer very little useful guidance to working scientists.
Ultimately, the role of Philosophy of Science amounts to what Locke stated "it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge." That said, there's an awful lot of rubbish to clear.
Whatever rubbish there is to clear in science, I am still waiting for a convincing example of any such rubbish having been cleared by philosophy of science in the past. Scientists always had to clean their own rubbish, and I suspect that they will do it in the future, too. Nobody else can help much.
Okay then. Look up “species concepts“ and tell me how that hot mess has been cleaned up. Be thorough.
A colleague of mine is working on defining "control" in AVH. She argues that different psychologists use the concept of "control" in very different ways, which explains their seemingly contradictory findings. Maybe not phil of sci, but it seems to be a good example of philosophy guiding science.
/ in which they can be well-trained that provide value. Eg finding holes in the logic of an argument (spotting hidden premises, equivocations etc). Or exploring the different possible meanings of a scientific concept (I think collaborative work in the foundations of physics is an example of this).
Again, not arguing that scientists *can't* do this. But when you are specifically trained in doing something, and you do it day in and day out, you do develop some expertise.
OK, give me examples where a philosopher discovered a hole in a scientific argument that scientists missed. You can be trained in logic to perfection, yet without the domain knowledge you are unlikely to be able to spot any errors. Errors reducible to faulty syllogisms are rare in science.
Definitely, domain-specific knowledge is crucial; that's why I think it's in collaboration *with* scientists that philosophers can be most of use. Re your question, I think you overestimate humans in general! All of us are susceptible to believing/constructing flawed arguments ...
Dennett was a philosopher who studied and worked alongside scientists. He avoided ivory tower academic philosophical jargon - to his credit. He had (enough) domain knowledge to make an impact on science. Part of the problem I see with the present conversation is that you guys are talking about...
...a philosopher has successfully clarified something if someone personally finds the attempted clarification clarifying! I would deny that no philosopher has ever clarified anything; and I also wouldn't claim that every philosophers' attempt is successful.
[[Conversation]] is never a problem. It is essential in every human enterprise. Prematurely choosing a course of action is a problem. (Never choosing a course is also a problem.)
The problem with this group is that analytic philosophy has almost no overlap with biology research. However, analytic philosophy has more overlap with theoretical physics: Bertrand Russell was 2 degrees of separation from Albert Einstein through Kurt Gödel.
![“The Metalogical Society had been started by Freddie Ayer [A. J. Ayer] in 1949 with the object of getting philosophers and scientists to meet and discuss problems which they felt had implications for, or relevance in, or perhaps even solutions in, each other’s fields. Among the scientist members were J. Z. Young, the zoologist and anatomist, who delivered the 1950 Reith Lectures on Doubt and Certainty in Science, F. G. Young, the biochemist, Peter Medawar, also later a Reith Lecturer and Director of the Medical Research Council, Lionel Penrose, the geneticist, and G. J. Renier, the historian. The philosophers included Karl Popper, Stuart Hampshire, Richard Wollheim, J. H. Woodger, J. R. Thompson, Ernest Hutten, Robin Skynner (who was, however, a psychiatrist by profession), and Humphrey Slater (who had edited Polemic). Alfred Tarski, the logician, was one of the guests I remember. There were meetings once every month or so; and the society thrived for over four years, partly because Freddie Ayer kept the numbers down to a maximum of about fifteen at a meeting, so that discussion could be kept to a point. Bertie [Russell] enjoyed the meetings very much, and so did I. However the society eventually faded out, I think—and so did Freddie Ayer —because of a failure of communication between philosophers and scientists. Part of the trouble was that the problems which worried the philosophers often left the scientists unmoved, and vice versa (but less $0); part was that the scientists tended not to recognize as their own the aims and methods which the philosophers attributed to them.” The key bit: “Part of the trouble was that the problems which worried the philosophers often left the scientists unmoved, and vice versa (but less so); part was that the scientists tended not to recognize as their own the aims and methods which the philosophers attributed to them.”](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:5fzxrbee5mpoomb4msfosabg/bafkreihafwp42qclphpwxrty7jmfqr7dh4cg2niyrrnyh44j55oljjavdm@jpeg)
How do you measure the degrees of separation? Neither two of the three gentlemen ever published anything academic together. All three knew each other well. (I am a biologist. My Erdős number is 3. As a measure of overlap, degrees of separation mean very little indeed :) )
The Gödel metric is a solution to Einstein's field equations. Gödel became interested in mathematical logic after studying Russell's Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Gödel is also an analytic philosopher. Analytic philosophy was co-founded by Russell.
Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein could have had a discussion about algebra or other math, but all the biologists in the room would have still complained that it had nothing to do with their biology research. It's more that biologists generally don't care about abstract topics like mathematics.
Biologists, and other scientists, as scientists, don’t care for things that don’t help them do their research better in a way they and their colleagues perceive as better. Physicists don’t care about much of maths, either. Einstein definitely didn’t have a broad knowledge of theoretical mathematics.
> Physicists don't care about much of maths "Theoretical physics is a branch of physics that employs mathematical models and abstractions of physical objects and systems to rationalize, explain, and predict natural phenomena."
Read again what I wrote. Yes, theoretical physics is mostly mathematics. But most of pure mathematics is not used in theoretical physics and theoretical physicists don’t care much about it - until somebody shows that some part of it can be useful for what they do.
Yes, there is an intersection between pure mathematics and theoretical physics, so they have something to talk about, but biology research doesn't intersect with either pure mathematics or theoretical physics. All the scientists in that group were biologists.
So is Carl, who started this discussion. What point are you trying to make?
During that time period, the logical positivism movement dominated in philosophy. Logical positivists thought only logic and science were useful, and prior philosophy was subjective bullshit that nobody could prove. Logical positivism is now considered debunked and dead in analytic philosophy.
Einstein cared. 'Einstein confided that his "own work no longer meant much, that he came to the Institute merely ... to have the privilege of walking home with Gödel". ... [The Gödel metric] would allow time travel to the past and caused Einstein to have doubts about his own theory.'
Einstein cared about concrete solutions to his equations. That supports what I wrote above.