I've had such discussions before. It always goes thus: somebody claims philosophy is relevant for sciences, I ask for details/evidence, and in the end I get "why do you think philosophy should be relevant for sciences?" :) I don't; it is the OP who did.
This is an intricate topic (do have a look at that paper of mine - I give an argument for this scepticism). However, one of my points is that philosophy/philosophy of science might simply be relevant in a different way (it's a mistake that it's relevant at the "front line"). Discussion here too:
I do not oppose your point - I just think that it is the scientists that should ultimately judge how relevant anything is for their science. Even if philosophers don't accept that as a principle, it is what will happen in practice anyway.
I tend to agree (and I try to point to an explanation for this in the paper of mine). But one of my main points is (maybe not in the paper) that the mission of philosophy of science lies elsewhere: unifying different fields of science, and unifying science with culture/politics in particular.
I have no reason to contest that. As for unifying different fields of science, I do hope that philosophy of science does a better job of it than some scientists did (e.g. I found E.O. Wilson's "Consilience" terrible in both ambition and execution).
I've managed to stay away from "consilience". But yea, my main point is that it isn't necessarily "the working scientist" that philosophers should be concerned with - until she moves outside her proper field. (Also: fields of science/academia/projects vary significantly with respect to this issue).