Yep. Insisting on a universal definition of some biological concepts amounts to "doing things with words" in a way that would inevitably make the resulting definition less useful. We use operative definitions that might differ according to context; there is no problem as long as we are aware of it.
I'm making precisely this point in my paper. That is: there is no such thing as "conceptual analysis" - apart from the analysis that scientists themselves need to make at "the front line of science". There are no "meanings" out there to be grasped with Pure Thought: it's all about expedient use.
(A few clarifications. 1st, I do think there is a role for conceptual analysis, not just in a detached sense. 2nd, some fields might find such analysis more useful than others. 3rd, such analysis often plays a major role in inter/multidisciplinary contexts, and when culture/politics is involved.)
As it happens, that is my published position. But if philosophy of science is such a bad thing, why do so many scientists do it?
P.S. I have never said or thought that philosophy of science is a bad thing. Just that it cannot do things for science and scientists that some people here claim it can (and should).
Nor, if you reread my original response upthread, did I say philosophy of science is needed by science.
The original post did.
I don’t know, but C. P. Snow had a suggestion why, back in 1934 :) Seriousy: in my field (genomics) very few scientists do philosophy of science. My conjecture is that there is too much to do in genomics itself. It appears to be more common in fields in which progress has slowed down.
