(And FWIW, as horrible as a larger war would be, if I were advising the Baltics especially, but probably also Finland and Poland and it looked like Ukraine was going to *fall,* my advice would be 'better to fight the Russians today, when they are tired, than tomorrow, when they are not.)
I really do think the West has been needlessly afraid of its own shadow in this conflict. Putin is probably incredibly afraid of us and what we would do to the Russian military and war economy in the first 24 hours of an actual conflict.
We are poorly served by leaders from the cold war era who remember when "7 Days to the River Rhine" was a serious threat. If we want to gamble we probably have a decent shot at fighting and winning a conflict with Russia in its current state.
The chances of Russia successfully pulling off a second strike have never been lower
That calculus *super* sucks but welcome to a post-liberal world.
On conventional capabilities, I’d easily pick the Europeans over Russia at this point. Russia’s operating beyond capacity—needing North Korean and Iranian help—and hasn’t been able to beat Ukraine. The issue is Russian nuclear threats and fears of an accidental spiral. Checking that would be useful.
At what point does NATO look at Russia on the battlefield and decide that maybe 3% of GDP on defense would probably be fine?
I read recently that the EU has a GDP of $18 Trillion. Add in Canada and Australia and it’s $20-22 Trillion. By comparison, Russia has a GDP of $2 Trillion, which is about the same as Georgia… the state. Russia is a declining power, but with an incredible amount of nuclear weapons.
It also doesn’t have the political constraints and collective action problems that a collection of democracies do. Europe could easily win a contest of money, and could likely win a contest of conventional force. A contest of will and execution? That’s a more open question.
Good point. In war, authoritarian governments do have the benefit of a unitary executive and predetermined elections.
Out of curiosity, what would you do with the US tripwire forces that are currently in the Baltics? Estonia, for example, is home to a rather large armored recc unit (5-7 CAV) at Camp Reedo. Would the Europeans replace them?
Could you trust the US forces not to be ordered to support the Russians?
Personally, I want them there, acting like a real tripwire. But the latter part gives me pause. Would this US govt, or a similar future one, acknowledge a Russian attack and respond with force? Or lie about it, blame Europe, and withdraw, or at least do nothing while throwing a public fit? 1/2
Given America's new unreliability, if I were EU, I'd want a plan to have E. Europe tripwire forces be European. But that would take a lgon time, and be part of the larger increase in defense spending, ideally with a formidable EU force like some have floated. I sure wouldn't ask the US to leave. 2/2
I don't find my answer all that satisfying. But it's a bad situation, and I don't see any short-term solution. You?
In the Baltics, that's already happening with the VJTF. It's Ukraine where the real commitments are, since it's larger.
I think it's called ARF now. But the same idea. Either way, how much of VJTF/ARF is American, in terms of personnel, equipment, and command? I know it's not a fixed amount, but I don't know the current make-up. But the more US-dependent it is, the less credible it is with Trump as president.