It was in response to Pope's support for Fremont's earlier policy of emancipation, which inspired more West Point coup grumblings even when Lincoln overturned the policy. McClellan gloated in the aftermath of the battle at having ensured Pope's defeat.
would you recommend any books on this? I've been rereading Battle Cry of Freedom the last week or so (the times call for it, sigh) but I need something meatier. general civil war reqs are welcome too!
Not quite on this topic, but Confederate Reckoning by Stephanie McCurry gets at the underlying issues in this convo & is maybe the best book I’ve read on the Civil War proper. I’m reviewing another great one right now that will hopefully transform the field, but it won’t be out for another year.
Thanks! I've meant to read McCurry's book for *years* after reading excerpts in college, and it always got away from me. Just ordered it! can't wait re: the new book, please don't forget to post about it when it comes out! probably also dividing back into Foner after I finish Battle Cry
Yeah, my civil war history professor argued the peninsula campaign was the combination of McClellan’s unconscious fear of actually fighting and his very conscious desire to push for “the constitution as it is/was” and forestall the impending collapse of slavery
I had forgotten about all of this (and, as far as I can remember, was totally unaware of Hooker’s treasonous ponderings) so I’m very thankful for this thread, going to lose a whole evening read up on this
Wasn’t it also over having units from the Army of the Potomac attached to Pope’s Army of Virginia? Porter faced a Court-martial over it!
That's right. McClellan viewed Pope's ascent as a demotion.
I hate McClellan with a fire of more than a thousand suns. That being said, I have a half joke/half serious take that Lee can’t be the best general of the Civil War if he couldn’t defeat the worst - George McClellan. Lee didn’t annihilate him on the peninsula and McC stopped him at Antietam
Lee also consistently misunderstood the larger political & strategic dynamics governing the war he waged. Whether we look at Seven Days, Antietam, or Gettysburg, he misunderstood the manpower deficit of white supremacy & its unpopularity outside of the enslaving class.
Disagree. I think Lee was so aggressive *because of* the manpower disadvantage. Ot was going to get *more* disadvantageous over time, w/ the enlistment of Black troops and the draft, as he and Jeff Davis undrrstood, so it made all the sense in the world to attempt to push things to a conclusion...
...before the Union manpower advantage could be put into the field. Didn't work, of course. But I don't think it was irrational, or bad strategy. In 1870, the Prussians won w/ a smaller army by maneuvering aggressively, at a high operational tempo.
Look, the fact that we're having this discussion at all is a triumph of Lost Cause propaganda, but I don't think it even makes sense w/o starting from the premise that the Confederacy itself was a fool's errand, tasked as it was w/operating both a police state & insurrection.
Even Jefferson Davis, when Lee proposed conscripting Black troops, was like "bruh, do you not get why we're fighting here?" I understand we're swimming against a significant current of white nostalgia here, but I just don't think we need to play that game.
Dude's project of revolutionary racial hierarchy was doomed from jump & there's no reason to believe he grasped those dynamics, fanning the flames of Black U.S. enlistment with his slave-catching bands in PA or depleting manpower that might have enabled a different strategy.
Confederate high command on 12/31/63: Patrick Clayburn is our best division commander! Confederate high command on 1/1/64: Who is Patrick Clayburn?
Lol yes exactly!
But dopey West Point reactionaries did have a special talent for making him look good in one-off battles.
Even the “common clay” racists of the South weren’t too crazy about the Southern elite’s desires to restrict democracy if that version of “democracy” excluded them.
This relates to one of McC’s huge blind spots: constantly overestimating the enemy’s strength. Pinkerton was giving him bunk intel but shouldn’t logic say that if the Union has a larger population, is more organized, and has better infrastructure, how could the rebs field armies that dwarfed his?