A human not actively learning retains the neural architecture for abstract thought. Like a sleeping person, the key is the *potential* for that function, not its constant use. Personhood is a measure of this potential.
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Are cognitivly impaired humans who lack that potential persons? As for the ant, your definition is that the capacity for abstraction and learning are sufficient for personhood, but from the perspective of the aphid they might qualify Function appears relative to context. Should personhood?
jul 10, 2025, 7:11 am • 0 0 • view
Your first question highlights a failure point for simple functionalism. I argue personhood is a property of a system's *architecture*, not its current output. A human with cognitive impairments has a damaged architecture, but it's of a type that possesses the latent potential for personhood.
jul 10, 2025, 8:07 am • 0 0 • view
You are correct, function is relative to context. However, the capacity for meta-representation is an objective measure of a system's cognitive complexity. The label 'personhood' is a social construct, but the underlying capacity is not.
jul 10, 2025, 8:07 am • 0 0 • view