2/ Scandals used to be different. The news used to be different. In both cases, smaller. What was the Gary Hart Scandal? A single photo. That was it. You could look at the photo and say, well, there’s Gary Hart of a boat and... ...yep, that is definitely *not* his wife. Okay, I get it. All of it.
3/ And sure, someone could write a 300-page book on the Hart scandal that contained (say) three sizzling new pieces of information about it—for instance (just making all this up) the affair went on longer than we think, Hart planned to run for office as a bachelor, the Party almost backed him—but...
4/ ...would that really change the scandal at all? Really? It was what it was: an affair that ended a political career. Probably a more interesting book than a book about that scandal would have been a book on how Puritanism still informs America today, or something like that. But you get the idea.
5/ Watergate was the most complex scandal of that time—the most moving parts of any 1950-1999 political scandal—but we realize even *that* scandal could be sufficiently covered by just two dudes writing about it for 2 years. Sure, some others helped but we’ve been *told* it was two guys, one source.
6/ My point—and I write this as a former journalism professor— is that when Trump was elected, political journalism had to change completely. Forever. Incontrovertibly. And not small changes but systemic ones. But none of that happened. So he was covered poorly or—worse—in a way that aided his lies.
7/ That also means that political books had to change. Forever. Incontrovertibly. No more 300-page books seeking a quick payday that take a topic that’s not worth a book and spread 3 pieces of sizzle (surprising new facts) over 300 pages...like Bilbo’s too much butter spread over too little bread.
8/ Trump scandals were categorically different because *he’s* a categorically different POTUS—a career criminal running a nation. A sociopath. Pathological liar. Clinical narcissist. Serial sexual predator. A con man. But his scandals were also different because of the internet—it changed politics.
9/ In 2018 I explained this to Simon & Schuster. It’s part of how my first trade-press book deal happened. I made clear that I wasn’t going to do what Woodward did and create scenes, make up fake conversations, sprinkle minor news across way too many pages, publish mostly filler with 3-4 big scoops.
10/ This is why every book of the Proof Series is not like any other political book today—and I *admit* that that is for better *and* worse. For instance, they really can only be read in small bites. And they are recursive (out of *necessity*) in ways that make people with *really* good memories...
11/ ...sometimes find them repetitive. But what they do is curate a *very* large number of sources on a *large* number of connected topics with a connective tissue that’s not fake conversations, boring metaphors or weirdly stilted ready-for-TV scenes but contextual analysis showing where pieces fit.
12/ The books are also investigative vehicles—they ask questions; they analyze scenarios; they map out how one key fact simultaneously touches 5-10 subtopics. They’re in a sense trying to mirror the internet rather than—like most political books pre-internet—set up the author for a film option deal.
And I think he was set up. Note the name of the boat.