3/ In a 19-minute video released by Korean Central Television, an FPV drone team, a pilot and a co-pilot, is shown striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kursk Oblast. The wiring setup suggests a reconnaissance unit with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building.
4/ The footage showed mobile ATGMs mounted on light pickup trucks. Using an optical seeker for real-time guidance, the system seem to be capable to conduct top-attack strikes. The adaptation signals Pyongyang’s intent to field mobile, low-cost, and modern anti-armor solutions
5/ The video also showed the better-known Bulsae-2 (or possibly Bulsae-3), NK’s version of the Soviet 9K111 ATGM. With an effective range of ~2.5 km, it’s far shorter-ranged than newer systems. Notably, the Bulsae-2 has already been documented in the hands of Hamas.
Bulsae – would that be pronounced as 'bullseye' perhaps?
6/ Another notable moment: NK troops were seen using the Russian-made Azart tactical radio, a 6th-gen handheld with digital modes, frequency hopping, and GPS/GLONASS sync. This indicates Pyongyang may have a deeper understanding of the practical role of comms in modern warfare
7/ We also noticed NK command posts using mapping software paired with live drone streaming interfaces, creating a makeshift functional battlefield awareness system.
8/ The propaganda video also highlighted infantry fire support: Type-75 107mm multiple rocket launchers and light mortars backing infantry. The Type-75, a North Korean copy of China’s Type-63, has 12 tubes, can fire Korean or Chinese ammo, and launch salvos up to 8.5 km.
9/ While this report focuses on the specific video, it's important to add that in February 2025, Japanese broadcaster NHK reported that Moscow and Pyongyang reached an agreement for Russian technical assistance in developing and mass-producing multiple drone types for North Korea
10/ By June 2025, Ukrainian military intel chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russia was assisting North Korea in producing Garpiya and Geran long-range kamikaze drones, modeled on Iran’s Shahed-136. Pyongyang also sent specialists to Moscow’s Technopark for UAV development.
11/ Russia’s support for North Korea goes beyond drones. Moscow has reportedly transferred at least one Pantsir air-defense system and provided data feedback from NK ballistic missile launches, helping improve Pyongyang’s missile accuracy and overall operational performance.
Is there any information about the South Korean response? One would think that they should be heavily invested in Ukraine.
12/ For the Korean Peninsula, this trajectory signals a more capable, modernized North Korean force, moving beyond outdated mid-20th-century playbooks. Globally, the risk extends further: Pyongyang has long supplied weapons to sanctioned actors, contributing to global instability
13/ While it’s uncertain how far North Korea can scale or replicate these lessons across its armed forces due to serious financial constraints, it’s clear that this experience won’t be buried, and Pyongyang will apply these insights wherever feasible.