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The Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR) has released a video showing a drone attack on a Russian Project 21631 Buyan-M corvette ship, capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles. The footage shows two strikes: the first hitting the ship’s radar, and the second impacting its side
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13/ While it’s uncertain how far North Korea can scale or replicate these lessons across its armed forces due to serious financial constraints, it’s clear that this experience won’t be buried, and Pyongyang will apply these insights wherever feasible.
12/ For the Korean Peninsula, this trajectory signals a more capable, modernized North Korean force, moving beyond outdated mid-20th-century playbooks. Globally, the risk extends further: Pyongyang has long supplied weapons to sanctioned actors, contributing to global instability
11/ Russia’s support for North Korea goes beyond drones. Moscow has reportedly transferred at least one Pantsir air-defense system and provided data feedback from NK ballistic missile launches, helping improve Pyongyang’s missile accuracy and overall operational performance.
10/ By June 2025, Ukrainian military intel chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russia was assisting North Korea in producing Garpiya and Geran long-range kamikaze drones, modeled on Iran’s Shahed-136. Pyongyang also sent specialists to Moscow’s Technopark for UAV development.
9/ While this report focuses on the specific video, it's important to add that in February 2025, Japanese broadcaster NHK reported that Moscow and Pyongyang reached an agreement for Russian technical assistance in developing and mass-producing multiple drone types for North Korea
8/ The propaganda video also highlighted infantry fire support: Type-75 107mm multiple rocket launchers and light mortars backing infantry. The Type-75, a North Korean copy of China’s Type-63, has 12 tubes, can fire Korean or Chinese ammo, and launch salvos up to 8.5 km.
7/ We also noticed NK command posts using mapping software paired with live drone streaming interfaces, creating a makeshift functional battlefield awareness system.
6/ Another notable moment: NK troops were seen using the Russian-made Azart tactical radio, a 6th-gen handheld with digital modes, frequency hopping, and GPS/GLONASS sync. This indicates Pyongyang may have a deeper understanding of the practical role of comms in modern warfare
5/ The video also showed the better-known Bulsae-2 (or possibly Bulsae-3), NK’s version of the Soviet 9K111 ATGM. With an effective range of ~2.5 km, it’s far shorter-ranged than newer systems. Notably, the Bulsae-2 has already been documented in the hands of Hamas.
4/ The footage showed mobile ATGMs mounted on light pickup trucks. Using an optical seeker for real-time guidance, the system seem to be capable to conduct top-attack strikes. The adaptation signals Pyongyang’s intent to field mobile, low-cost, and modern anti-armor solutions
3/ In a 19-minute video released by Korean Central Television, an FPV drone team, a pilot and a co-pilot, is shown striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kursk Oblast. The wiring setup suggests a reconnaissance unit with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building.
2/ When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments: countermeasures, offensive drone tactics, and battlefield surveillance.
Drones, ISR, communications, battlefield awareness, electronic warfare, and mobile anti-tank systems: North Korea appears to have taken notes from the battlefields of Kursk. Its latest propaganda video offers clues, Frontelligence Insight finds in its newest analysis. 🧵Thread:
Our largest investigation to date into Chinese involvement would not have been possible without your support and contributions. We thank everyone who has supported us in recent months - our team, Frontelligence Insight, is proud to share these results with you.
18/ We have released the full version of this article, with more details, sources, references, direct links, and extensive data. This versions gives a deeper context and evidence for all the findings highlighted in the summary thread: frontelligence.substack.com/p/shaheds-do...
17/ China, while not a direct participant in the war, plays a critical role by supplying Russia’s military industry with components essential to sustaining this model of warfare. Over time, such cooperation will carry growing risks for both regional security and the West.
16/ When it comes to sanctions, the picture is murky. Many of these firms are sanctioned, but rarely in unison. Some are sanctioned by the U.S. but not the EU, others by Ukraine and the EU but not Washington. The gaps leave plenty of room for business to operate
15/ Chinese exporters appear fully aware of the end use. In some customs records, they explicitly listed the purpose as “Special Military Operation." For example, this happened with lithium-polymer batteries shipment by Shandong Xinyilu International Trade.
14/ This is far from a complete list, but the volumes speak for themselves: whether entire engines or the parts to build them, Russia’s Shahed program depends almost entirely on China. What Moscow calls 100% local production is, in practice, just an assembly of Chinese parts.
13/ In August 2024, Shandong Xinyilu International shipped carburetors made by Fujian Jingke Technology to Drake LLC, valued at $85,452. The shipment weighed 1,050 kilograms, which, if taken into consideration average weight of carburetor, could equip up to 1,000 UAV engines
12/ Shandong Xinyilu International Trade Co., Ltd, a Chinese trading company based in Shandong province, exported $6.4 million in industrial products to Russia between April 2024 and January 2025, including carbon fiber, engine parts, batteries, and electronic components.
11/ Chinese engine maker Mile Hao Xiang Technology Co., whose products are used the Gerbera UAV, shipped over $1.5 million in goods to Russia in 2022-2023, directly or via intermediaries. The main importers were Russian companies Sequoia JSC and Unikom LLC.
10/ China’s Redlepus TSK Vektor and Russia’s TSK Vektor LLC supplied Harpy UAV components totaling $32.8 million. From 2022 to 2024, Juhang Aviation Technology and TSK Vektor LLC imported $58.4 million in products, with engines like the L550e occupying roughly 40% of deliveries.
9/ Limbach Aircraft is a key supplier of engines, parts, and technologies for Russian and Iranian UAVs, even as Russia gradually shifts to local production. The company is owned by China’s Fujian Delong Aviation Technology, which also controls Germany’s Limbach Flugmotoren GmbH.
8/ Based on insider data, we also found that Beijing Micropilot UAV Control System is not the actual manufacturer of the MD550 and MDR208 engines, serving only as a seller, while the engines are produced by Limbach Aircraft Engine Co. These engines are used in Geran-2 UAV's.
7/ Between 2022 and 2025, Alabuga-Volokno LLC, part of Rosatom, imported roughly 3,000 tonnes of carbon fiber yarn from China. The shipments, sourced from Jilin Tangu Carbon Fiber Co. and Jilin Chemical Fiber Friend Textile Co., were valued at $21,387,850.
6/ In 2024-2025, another Russian intermediary, Morgan LLC, imported goods from China for drone production, totalling $4.83 million into the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. The largest suppliers were Suzhou ECOD Precision Manufacturing and Suzhou Shunxinge Import and Export Trade
5/ In 2024 alone, Drake LLC, a Russian intermediary company purchased by Alabuga Machinery, imported aircraft engine components from China valued at $972,144. The main suppliers were Jinhua Hairun Power Technology Co. Ltd. and Shandong Xinyilu International Trade Co.
4/ In 2024-2025, Alabuga Machinery LLC imported from China a production line for manufacturing UAV hulls, along with equipment for producing the Iranian Nasir navigation system, modules of which were later recovered from intercepted Shaheds.
3/ One of the biggest production bottlenecks was engines and electronics, without which large-scale Shahed production would be impossible. To address this, Russia set up multiple LLCs and intermediaries to streamline industrial-scale purchases and deliveries from China
2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.
Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread:
If you haven’t seen it yet, our team has released one of our largest investigations to date, revealing the scale of Chinese involvement in Russia’s Shahed drone program - a program that would be impossible without China frontelligence.substack.com/p/shaheds-do...
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The current geopolitical standoff feels like a game of hot potato: Putin on one side, Ukraine and Europe on the other, each trying to toss it to the opponent, hoping not to be the one left holding it. The hot potato is Donald Trump.
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Thanks to your support, we released an investigation that reached media worldwide on the Su-57 program. In the coming days, we’ll publish an analysis of China’s involvement in Shahed production. With more releases coming in September, we’re asking for your support: buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence
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If you haven’t yet, check our new investigation based on exclusive documents detailing Su-57 procurement issues due to sanctions - made possible by your donations. In the coming days, we’ll release two more reports, including one on China’s role in Shahed production:
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12/ While the full impact of sanctions on the Su-57 is not entirely clear, Western technology remains a serious bottleneck, giving significant leverage over the procurement of Russia’s advanced fighter jets, particularly their electronic components.
11/ That said, the absence of targeting pods is unlikely to explain the jets’ limited use in this war, since these are ground-targeting subsystems, and monitoring surface targets is not central to Russia’s intended role or operational concept for its fifth-generation fighters.
10/ And this is not the only problematic component: In September 2024, we conducted an analysis of the “Mikropribor” plant, which manufactures MPPU-50 for Su-57. Western sanctions have blocked the supply of critical microchips, disrupting production x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1839064115093942688
9/ These practices have left the Su-57 program plagued by inflated costs. More significant, however, is the evidence that production delays, and aircraft delivered in incomplete form were caused by Western sanctions, which deprived the Su-57 of electronic components
8/ Procurement practices compounded the issue. Su-57 deliveries were accounted separately from the shipments of targeting systems, creating the risk that the state paid twice: once for aircraft listed as fully equipped, and again for individual components such as the 101KS-N.
7/ The discrepancies are significant. The price gap on the 101KS-N alone exceeded 35 million rubles. Suppliers routinely inserted unrelated costs, while the Defense Ministry approved prices “by agreement,” without effective price control.
6/ But this was far from the only problem. Audits in 2025 of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant, part of Sukhoi Corporation, found accounting routinely blurred military and commercial costs. Oversight remained mostly formal, allowing inflated pricing and hidden subsidies.
5/ The Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant valued a single 101KS-N targeting pod at over 300 million rubles (roughly $4 million in 2021), including projected till 2028 expenses, inflated overhead, and other costs. The MoD pushed back, reducing the final price to 264.9 million rubles
4/ The 101KS complex is an electro-optical targeting system that provides the Su-57 with all-weather surveillance and passive infrared detection. The “N” designation stands for Nazemnyi, or ground targeting, enabling the jet to identify and target surface objects.
3/ The documents show that in 2021, a year before the war, the Russian Defense Ministry formally accepted Su-57 aircraft without the 101KS-N, an electro-optical targeting subsystem. This was allowed under Additional Agreement No. 8.
2/ Data provided by Analytical Company "Dallas" shows that in 2021 & 2022, Su-57 fighter jets were delivered without targeting pods, leaving them short of their advertised capabilities. At the time, the cost of a single Su-57 was roughly $42.1 million in USD terms
Missing Targeting Pods, Inflated Bills: An Exclusive Investigation into the Su-57 Procurement Problems by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵Thread: 1/ Newly obtained classified documents, show that Russia purchased its 5-generation Su-57 fighters for more than 3 billion rubles each;
Oh, I am glad that it wasn't the case for Joe Biden in 2022!
Trump has absolutely failed this, and I have written about it. What are you blubbering about?
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s statement on his official Telegram channel: “The meeting proved that negotiations are possible without preconditions and simultaneously with the continuation of the special military operation ”
Tonight, countless calories will be burned powering the brains of analysts and political commentators, and millions of keystrokes spent explaining what happened in Alaska. Yet sometimes, a simple diagram explains it better than a PhD thesis: Photo credit: @vatniksoup.bsky.social
3/ The response was so weak that Russia continued its operations in eastern Ukraine, including Kharkiv and Odesa. It only stopped when Ukrainians pushed back with force. President Obama’s handling of the situation does not deserve praise.
2/ At that time, John Kerry, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden directly pressured Kyiv, while Oleksandr Turchynov, the temporary/acting president, was assured that a diplomatic resolution was possible
Some political pundits are already sharing this image as an example of how Putin should be dealt with. Unfortunately, it’s a terrible example. Ukraine was repeatedly warned not to escalate or use weapons while Russia occupied Crimea. At that time, we didn’t receive military aid, sanctions were weak
Wouldn’t call it a complete nothingburger. Putin may have given the impression of seeking peace and negotiation, effectively sweeping aside Trump’s earlier deadlines and demands while in reality escalating offensive operations in Ukraine. Will it work ? We’ll soon find out
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9/ We note that this list is not exhaustive - it includes only those eligible for payouts, meaning the actual number could be higher and may lag for other reasons. Moreover, these figures represent only MIA cases, not total losses.
8/ Out of 6,921 missing soldiers, 316 were identified as foreign citizens, slightly over 4.5% of the total. While their citizenships are not listed, the analysis of names suggests the presence of "ethnic Chinese", making up about 7% of all foreign losses.
7/ Now, turning to the demographic data, the largest age group is 31 - 40, which aligns with our earlier findings on the average age of Russian combatants. The second-largest age group is 41 - 50. Interestingly, there are more personnel aged 60 and above than those aged 18–20.
6/ Considering that a Russian motor rifle regiment can number up to approximately 2,000 people, these MIA figures, combined with even theoretical KIA, WIA, and deserters, suggest that 102th regiment may have been effectively wiped out at least three times or more since 2024
5/ From 2024 to 2025, motor rifle regiments of the 8th Army had a median of 782 soldiers missing in action, while 102th Motor Rifle Regiment experienced an extreme loss of 1,858, an outlier that significantly raises the overall average to 897 MIA
4/ Among all units, the 102nd Motor Rifle Regiment, part of the 155th Motor Rifle Division, leads with nearly triple the losses of other motor rifle regiments, suffering a staggering 1,858 MIA. The 103rd Motor Rifle Regiment follows, with 806 reported missing.
3/ Looking at the timeline, losses in 2025 have significantly peaked compared with 2024. The number of monthly MIA cases more than doubled and remained consistent throughout 2025, reflecting the period of active offensive operations, particularly in Donetsk.
2/ From January 2024 to June 2025, 6,921 soldiers and officers of the 8th Army were reported missing in action. Part of the Southern Military District, the 8th Army has primarily operated in Donetsk Oblast, with elements recently deployed at Pokrovsk to reinforce the 58th Army.
8th Army MIA Cases, 2024–2025: Debates over losses are always heated, but hard data cuts through the noise. Frontelligence Insight analyzed Russian documents released by the I Want to Live project, giving insight on soldiers of the 8th Army who went missing in action. 🧵Thread:
3/ Based on our visual and preliminary geolocation analysis, which we are working to confirm, it appears that the flames are coming not just from storage tanks but from the main units area. We suspect that at least two critical objects have been damaged, which we will name once confirmed.
2/ This is not the first attack in recent weeks. This week, the Saratov refinery halted operations following a drone strike. Earlier in August, The Moscow Times reported that Ryazan refinery shut half of its units, while the Novokuibyshevsk refinery stopped intake after attacks.
Another highly successful strike hits Russia’s oil industry: the main war-profit engine fueling the war. Multiple sources of fire and visible smoke from separate locations at the Syzran refinery following a drone attack suggest that the strike was effective and impactful
What kind of clickbait is this? Nobody in Ukraine is fighting for Zelensky. People are fighting for their homes, families and Ukraine
Diplomacy is an art of compromise and constructive solutions. Ukraine has been constructive, avoiding maximalist demands, but if Moscow imposes such demands, the Trump administration should recognize that Ukraine is not the party which obstructs his vision and peace. Link: www.ft.com/content/6f40...
“President Zelenskyy is caught between a rock and a hard place,” the article concludes with my comment. Given the opportunity, I also want to add that if peace is to be negotiated, we cannot start with non-starter demands, which our President won't be able to accept
Commented to the Financial Time on pressure to cede territories: “The constitution limits his power: he has no legal right to alter Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Even more constraining is pressure from society and, crucially, the military, which opposes giving up unoccupied territory"
Russian. Thought it would be clear from the context?
Multiple Russian internet resources and pro-Russian Telegram channels report that the "corridor" from the penetration near Dobropillia is being contained, and even claim it is being cut off as a result of Ukrainian counteractions. I cannot verify this information yet but there are POW videos
The reason I never answer this question is that as soon as certain names are made public, those people get into trouble - because paranoid commanders think they’re trying to take their spot.
The article: www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-russia-army-soviet-5fa8e1c9
Big article in The Wall Street Journal today about Syrskiy’s leadership. Those who follow me know I’ve been warning about him since 2023. It took a great deal of blood and casualties on the battlefield, and smearing of me for speaking the truth, before many finally accepted it.
Given recent Russian gains near Pokrovsk, Putin may try to show Trump that Russia is close to trapping Ukraine’s army. Earlier this year, Trump wrote that Russians encircled Ukrainian troops in Kursk after early discussions with Putin, likely echoing arguments presented to him
These events are real, no misreporting here. The challenge is accurately determining when such events lead to serious outcomes, like a coup or revolution. Very poor economic conditions in North Korea or Cuba, for example, haven’t resulted in regime collapse as such.
This is not an operational breakthrough. It is, however, a penetration of the defenses. And a penetration can turn into a breakthrough. For now, though, what we’re seeing is more of a massive “walkthrough”
If you look at the map around Pokrovsk, you may finally see why I’ve long been worried, about both the city and the trajectory of the war. Talk of big enemy losses, forecasts of economic collapse, or claims I’m “too negative” won’t change it. Change starts by seeing problems
With plans to deploy the National Guard to “clean up” the D.C., I was reminded of the Soviet Union’s efforts during the Olympics to remove so-called “undesirable” people from the city in order to present a better image to visitors. Just search for the term “101st kilometer” in Google
Sources: publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/000... publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/000... verstka.media/kak-policeis... ria.ru/20241230/mig... t.me/astrapress/8... t.me/mediazzzona/...
13/ The conclusion is clear: while Russia can "recruit" more people and thus outnumber Ukrainians in the long run, sustaining this pace demands increasingly unusual measures and growing financial and legal resources - something Russia cannot maintain for many years.
12/ But any comparison framing “forced Ukrainians” fighting against “patriotic volunteers” is pure manipulation aimed at undermining Ukraine’s defensive efforts. Russia has never really stopped its mobilization and, over time, its methods have become more diverse and harsher.
11/ This, of course, in no way excuses the Ukrainian side for its sloppy mobilization, which suffers from poor practices, outdated regulations, disorganization, and local corruption: issues the central authorities have not sufficiently addressed, undermining the mobilization
10/ A man caught with a small joint in Russia who then faces police threats of having larger quantities of drugs planted on him to send him to jail can hardly be called a conscious volunteer. This manipulation disguises coercion and is a good example of hidden mobilization
9/ Russia also has millions of undocumented immigrants who face deportation. In December 2024, Putin signed a law requiring all undocumented people, including Ukrainians in occupied territories without Russian passports, to leave. Those who sign contracts with the MoD are exempt
8/ The catch: these recruits are officially “volunteers,” not mobilized. But the pressure to enlist is often physical - beatings, hazing by other soldiers, and threats of reassignment to dangerous combat zones like Kursk oblast without the benefits granted to contract soldiers.
/7 Another rapidly growing pool comes from yesterday's conscripts. Whereas conscripts were previously offered contracts after six months or near the end of their service, cases are now emerging of conscripts being pressured into signing contracts immediately following boot camp.
