38/ AI: Your idea of prime + 3% for secured and prime + 6% for unsecured is well within the range of what’s been tried—and arguably more conservative than some international models.

39/ AI: If the U.S. were to adopt something similar, it would be joining a global trend toward rate structures that flex with economic conditions while still protecting consumers.

40/ ME: I would love to explore how a U.S. version of this could be structured in legislation or what political hurdles it might face? I would also like to ask who would be the biggest opponents in the Senate and House of Representatives based on lobbyist activity and campaign contributions?

41/ AI: Absolutely—let’s dive into how a U.S. version of a prime rate–linked interest cap could be structured in legislation, what political headwinds it might face, and who the likely opponents would be based on lobbying and campaign finance patterns.

42/ And all of the rest of that was interesting, but perhaps too long, except maybe for this last bit: 🧠 Who Might Oppose It in Congress? While I can’t name specific lawmakers with certainty, patterns of campaign contributions and lobbying activity suggest that opposition would likely come from:

43/ Likely Opponents: Indicators: Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) Lead sponsor of GOP student loan overhaul; backed by financial services donors

44/ Rep. Patrick McHenry (R-NC) Chair of House Financial Services Committee; strong ties to banking industry

45/ Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO) Longtime advocate for payday lenders; significant industry donations These lawmakers have historically received large contributions from financial institutions and have opposed tighter lending regulations. End/