If we're in a shooting way with China that includes hitting US territory and aerial fights over/a naval invasion of Taiwan, no, there are no other real options unless we want to fight to not lose, which is a great way to ultimately lose anyways.
If we're in a shooting way with China that includes hitting US territory and aerial fights over/a naval invasion of Taiwan, no, there are no other real options unless we want to fight to not lose, which is a great way to ultimately lose anyways.
Using scarce long-range strike munitions against landed Chinese forces is another option. Using those munitions against a different mainland target like air bases is another option. Using those munitions against Chinese islands like Fiery Cross reef is another options, etc
Declaring an area off limits is different than level of priority. If a military unit doesn't even have to worry about being hit, they can operate differently
I haven't argued for anything declared anything off limits. My original reply was that the OP was ignoring the MARGINAL risk, which directly implies difference and prioritization
And priority that incorporates the escalation risk of various missions (say, those that might accidentally degrade Chinese Nuclear C2 vs those that do not), not to the exclusion of other considerations but because those risks are real and worth considering.
Escalation risk is highest from the first attack
It escalates you to a war. The risk that China incurs is that it assures U.S. involvement and less international support. If the U.S. were to respond with a decapitation attack against Beijing that is still escalatory relative to where you were before.
Just because China attacked Guam or Hawaii doesn't mean that thousands of mainland strikes colocated with cities or degrading their nuclear C2 or launching a punishment campaign against Beijing isn't escalatory.
A strike on Guam is not a blank check. You can still do these campaigns if you think the benefits are worth the risk. But asserting they aren't there means that you will stumble into situations you're not ready for.
Except we'd already be at war, the strike being discussed hits US based on US soil. Attacking Beijing to kill leadership is also very, very different than attacking anti air installations.
Yes that is my point. The example of attacks on Beijing is escalatory. And "anti-air installations" includes many different kinds of targets, some of which are SAMs in the middle of nowhere, some of which are SAMs located in cities, some of which are C2 which also form of their nuclear deterrent
From the Chinese perspective, could thousands of these attacks, necessarily geographically broad in scope, enable follow on attacks against other targets like critical infrastructure? Or leadership? Could they be excuses to undermine China's strategic deterrent?
Rolling back China's IADS leave them vulnerable to strategic attacks in a way that strikes on Guam do not leave the U.S. vulnerable. The idea that these strikes aren't escalatory assumes that China doesn't think that there is any difference between the two, and I suspect that they would.
No, the escalation was bombing US soil. Rolling over and letting China bomb US soil and not doing the same isn't de escalation, it's cowardice. You set the precedent that they can bomb us but we won't do the same. If anything, it makes escalation even more likely.
I am not saying it's deescalation to not attack SAM targets, i am not saying the U.S. should deescalate, I am not saying you can't fight that campaign, I am simply saying that fighting that campaign comes with more risk relative to other U.S. options (and less risk relative to others).
And the US doesn't really have a choice over whether the mainland gets hit, Taiwan will make that choice for you.
No the U.S. gets to decide what it does with our munitions
China is not going to care which flag is stencelled on the missiles that hit their air defence sites, unless the US stays out of the conflict entirely then they are going to treat all hostility as US derived.