Only philosophers of biology and some zoologists fuss about the concept of species. Most biologists who have any use for the concept know that there is no definition that can be made to work for all branches of the tree of life. And no working biologists have need for a unifying definition.
How many conceptual problems in biology boil down to "how long is a piece of string"?
Yep. Insisting on a universal definition of some biological concepts amounts to "doing things with words" in a way that would inevitably make the resulting definition less useful. We use operative definitions that might differ according to context; there is no problem as long as we are aware of it.
I'm making precisely this point in my paper. That is: there is no such thing as "conceptual analysis" - apart from the analysis that scientists themselves need to make at "the front line of science". There are no "meanings" out there to be grasped with Pure Thought: it's all about expedient use.
(A few clarifications. 1st, I do think there is a role for conceptual analysis, not just in a detached sense. 2nd, some fields might find such analysis more useful than others. 3rd, such analysis often plays a major role in inter/multidisciplinary contexts, and when culture/politics is involved.)
As it happens, that is my published position. But if philosophy of science is such a bad thing, why do so many scientists do it?
P.S. I have never said or thought that philosophy of science is a bad thing. Just that it cannot do things for science and scientists that some people here claim it can (and should).
Nor, if you reread my original response upthread, did I say philosophy of science is needed by science.
The original post did.
I don’t know, but C. P. Snow had a suggestion why, back in 1934 :) Seriousy: in my field (genomics) very few scientists do philosophy of science. My conjecture is that there is too much to do in genomics itself. It appears to be more common in fields in which progress has slowed down.
Surely it's botanist more than zoologists who might get their minds occupied by the species problem? And sure, biologists working on specific fields/issues (yes, a major part of biologists/their work) might not find the problem relevant. But it becomes relevant once you start unifying the projects.
Most botanists are pragmatic and know they do not have anything as sharp as mammalian or avian reproductive barrier to make it the main criterion. And those who work on asexually reproducing species know that, in their case, the species is no more special than the taxonomic ranks above and below it.
My point was merely: *if there are biologists bothered by the problem, *then these are more likely to be botanists than zoologists. Anyway, I might be sympathetic to (some) of the things you are saying. I'd ask: perhaps it's a mistake to think that philosophy should be relevant to sciences? Cf:
P.S. Thanks for the paper link - looks very interesting and relevant, and indeed, it seems that we do agree on many things.
I thought we would! I get what you are saying. I'm a philosopher. But I've worked with scientists, biologists in particular (spent 10 yrs at a physiology deparment). I do think there's a lot of hot air in philosophy of science. I don't think it's useless, but the project is largely misunderstood.
" I'd ask: perhaps it's a mistake to think that philosophy should be relevant to sciences?" - That is the exact claim Carl made in the original post I reacted to - because I thought it might be a mistake.
I've had such discussions before. It always goes thus: somebody claims philosophy is relevant for sciences, I ask for details/evidence, and in the end I get "why do you think philosophy should be relevant for sciences?" :) I don't; it is the OP who did.
This is an intricate topic (do have a look at that paper of mine - I give an argument for this scepticism). However, one of my points is that philosophy/philosophy of science might simply be relevant in a different way (it's a mistake that it's relevant at the "front line"). Discussion here too:
I do not oppose your point - I just think that it is the scientists that should ultimately judge how relevant anything is for their science. Even if philosophers don't accept that as a principle, it is what will happen in practice anyway.
I tend to agree (and I try to point to an explanation for this in the paper of mine). But one of my main points is (maybe not in the paper) that the mission of philosophy of science lies elsewhere: unifying different fields of science, and unifying science with culture/politics in particular.
I have no reason to contest that. As for unifying different fields of science, I do hope that philosophy of science does a better job of it than some scientists did (e.g. I found E.O. Wilson's "Consilience" terrible in both ambition and execution).
I've managed to stay away from "consilience". But yea, my main point is that it isn't necessarily "the working scientist" that philosophers should be concerned with - until she moves outside her proper field. (Also: fields of science/academia/projects vary significantly with respect to this issue).