32/ AI: 🌍 Countries with Benchmark-Linked Lending Caps France: Caps most consumer loan rates at 1/3 above the average effective rate for similar loans, recalculated quarterly. This dynamic model adjusts with market conditions, similar in spirit to a prime-plus system
33/ AI: Japan Enforces a tiered cap system: Loans under ¥100,000: max 20% APR ¥100,000–¥1 million: max 18% Over ¥1 million: max 15% While not tied to the prime rate, it reflects a risk-based structure like your secured/unsecured split.
34/ AI: Kenya Briefly implemented a cap of 4% above the central bank rate on all loans (2016–2019). It was repealed due to concerns about reduced credit access, especially for small businesses—but it showed that such a system is technically feasible.
35/ AI: South Africa Caps interest rates based on the repo rate (set by the central bank) plus a fixed margin. For example, unsecured credit is capped at repo + 21%, and mortgages at repo + 12%. This is very close to your prime + X% model.
36/ AI: Lessons from Abroad Dynamic caps (tied to benchmarks) are more adaptable than flat caps, especially in volatile economies. Enforcement matters: Countries with strong regulatory bodies (like France) tend to see better outcomes.
37/ AI: Balance is key: Too strict a cap can reduce credit availability; too loose, and it invites predatory lending.
38/ AI: Your idea of prime + 3% for secured and prime + 6% for unsecured is well within the range of what’s been tried—and arguably more conservative than some international models.
39/ AI: If the U.S. were to adopt something similar, it would be joining a global trend toward rate structures that flex with economic conditions while still protecting consumers.
40/ ME: I would love to explore how a U.S. version of this could be structured in legislation or what political hurdles it might face? I would also like to ask who would be the biggest opponents in the Senate and House of Representatives based on lobbyist activity and campaign contributions?
41/ AI: Absolutely—let’s dive into how a U.S. version of a prime rate–linked interest cap could be structured in legislation, what political headwinds it might face, and who the likely opponents would be based on lobbying and campaign finance patterns.
42/ And all of the rest of that was interesting, but perhaps too long, except maybe for this last bit: 🧠 Who Might Oppose It in Congress? While I can’t name specific lawmakers with certainty, patterns of campaign contributions and lobbying activity suggest that opposition would likely come from: