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Process and manufacturing engineer. Lvl 1 Certified Amateur Rocketeer 🚀. #NAFO fella. Casual OSINT. All opinions are my own. Member of @tochnyi.info
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End. Finally, a big thank you to the entire @tochnyi.info team for their support.
6. Disrupting nodes like Alabuga is not simple. But understanding its ecosystem and the vulnerabilities hidden within it is essential to countering Russia’s drone surge. Especially when one of the key components of Shaed is still hand-made.
5. But here’s the paradox: Alabuga’s “self-sufficient” war industry depends on fragile supply chains. Carbon fibre production is impossible without an adequate flux of oxygen & nitrogen, once supplied by Air Liquide’s infrastructure.
4. Inside the plant, workers hand-layer carbon fibre for Shahed airframes. That carbon fibre comes from Alabuga-Fibre (UMATEX), acquired by Rosatom, aiming to hit 10,000 tonnes per year by 2030.
3. Alabuga has expanded quickly: new production halls, dormitories, and workshops. Thanks to tax breaks, customs benefits, and state investment, it has turned it into one of Russia’s most important industrial clusters.
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings. tochnyi.info/2025/08/alab...
Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link New @tochnyi.info investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series. If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow.
End. Due to its importance, we encourage others to investigate more: @rusi.bsky.social @csis.org As always, big thanks to @tochnyi.info team for supporting this and to Jonathan for peer review and to Chris for the graphics.
5. When completed, it could intercept radio signals thousands of km away, track NATO comms, and talk to subs deep under the Baltic. A relic of Soviet “Krug” tech… updated for modern electronic warfare. And it’s rising right on NATO’s doorstep.
4. 🚧 Construction timeline: • Mar 2023, first new roadwork spotted • May 2023, two outer rings defined • Jul 2023, forest cleared, perimeter walls rise • Jul 2024, all rings visible from space • Jul 2025, central hub taking shape Source: Sentinel-2
3. The site spans up to 1.6 km in diameter, far larger than most known military antenna arrays. Six concentric rings. 180 evenly spaced points are likely for vertical antennas. This isn’t a radar. It’s something bigger: a CDAA a Cold War–era listening giant reborn. 🎯
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, using satellite imagery we noticed: a massive, perfectly circular construction. Huge size. Strategic location. We decided to investigate. 🛰️
1. The full article can be found here: tochnyi.info/2025/08/puti...
Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array Our latest at @tochnyi.info investigation into Putin's military expansion in Europe focuses on a new intelligence site under construction in Kaliningrad, just 25km from the Polish border.
🚨 URGENT: We’re procuring with @KrikOksana20875 net guns to stop deadly Russian FPV drones and protect soldiers of the 93rd mechanised brigade. Each unit costs just £380. Extra funds go to camouflage nets. 💥 Help us save lives: www.paypal.com/pools/c/9hcr...
I think this is a general rule someone in their high command came up to, and they need to obey. But since they cannot cover each plane they use of useless tire they ended up covering only those they do not use.
Tires serve as a form of protection. However, ground operation personnel use fewer tires on operational planes, so they can quickly replace them. Those not operative have way more tires since they are not going to be moved anytime soon.
Conclusions: This thread is a compilation of verified reports and fresh analysis by members of Tochnyi, a collective dedicated to delivering careful and accurate analyses on the war in Ukraine. 📹 YouTube (youtube.com/@Tochnyi) 🌐 Explore more at our website for deep dives & updates. (tochnyi.info)
📡 SAR blackout Post-strike analysis revealed radar interference over Olenya Airbase. Using Bellingcat’s Radar Interference Tracker, analysts spotted a telltale "X" pattern pinpointing a 2017-era radar system at the missile defence HQ as the likely source. 6/6
The FPV drones were equipped with flexible linear-shaped charges. These copper-lined warheads do not produce a pointed stream of molten metal. Instead, they create a linear molten jet - capable of slicing through structures, such as aircraft, with surgical precision. 5/6
What are the key visual clues? Engineering tools and tire coverings. 🟥 Not in running condition: Covered in old tires. 🟩 Working: Few/no coverings, easy access for rapid launch. This reveals a Russian trade-off: protection vs. readiness under pressure. 4/6
Tu-22M3 bombers targeted in Operation Spider’s web fall into 2 categories: 1️⃣ Derelict airframes in long-term storage—covered in moss, missing parts, clearly out of service. 2️⃣ Operational jets—clean, maintained, with support gear nearby, stored in revetments. 3/6
At Olenya Airbase (68.14549, 33.45028), the Tu-95 bombers had KH-101 missiles mounted, cockpit ladders extended, and maintenance gear scattered nearby; clear signs these aircraft were operational and being serviced at the time of the strike. 2/6
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine executed meticulously planned, multi-pronged, and most advanced FPV drone missions to date operation targeting airbases that house long-range bombers. For a thorough analysis, refer to our linked main article. tochnyi.info/2025/06/a-deep… 1/6
🕷️🧵 “Operation Spiderweb”: Ukraine’s bold and precision-engineered drone strike on Russian strategic air bases. This thread will explore the more intriguing aspects of Ukraine’s recent drone strike on Russian airbases.
@tochnyi.info podcast is live right now join us! www.youtube.com/live/OmNUJbV...
Thank you Erlend!
Is with enormous happiness that I can say we achieved our target! And all the money has been transferred to Oksana! Thank you all for your support
We are doing great folks! 300 To go!!!
=FUNDRAISER= Net of life is starting today! With my friend Oksana and Union Power Nation NGO we are raising funds to provide raw materials to build camouflage nets! We plan to help them with funds to cover 30 nets. Help us to save lives. Thank you! Link here: www.paypal.com/pools/c/9eEh...
Sunday May 4th: “Drone Interceptions with Come Back Alive and Dronefall” Guests: ⭐️Kate Leschyshyn, Head of International Partnerships, Come Back Alive ⭐️Taras Tymochko, Head of the Dronefall Project ▶️Artem, @artempdko.bsky.social ▶️Erlend, @edrotning.tochnyi.info www.youtube.com/live/MAqsdRC...
🧵A loading facility preparing KH-101 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) along with an unknown number of KH-101 missiles were destroyed in the strike of the 20th March 2025 on Engels-2 airfield, imagery from Maxar suggests. 1/5
This article I wrote a few days ago is more relevant than ever. I was almost certain that a diplomatic approach would not change the Trump administration's stance. Europe must take a stand for the sake of freedom and democracy. Europe has allies, but it needs to take bold and decisive action now.
💥 Operation of special Ukrainian FPV drone!
@jonnyjohns.bsky.social thank you man it was corrupted now this should work.
1️⃣1️⃣ If you enjoyed the thread continue in the full article on @tochnyi.info website link below: tochnyi.info/2025/02/euro...
However, I would like to stress that some of the point I raised have priority. After also satellites 🛰️ is an area where we should grow and in this Europe economy could benefit. If we have to spend in defence, we should maximise what we spend in Europe. Our security our investments our growth.
You opened a Pandora box. I think are all valid points and all are in my opinion under discussion. Especially nuclear deterrence. Both UK and France in their doctrines consider the use of nuclear weapon to defend allies. But we probably need more capabilities especially for air launch.
(END) A big thanks to the entire @tochnyi.info team for their support of my work. A special thanks always to Jonathan for his help in proofreading the article.
🔟 Europe’s choices now will shape global stability. A weak response emboldens the “Axis of Tyranny.”The time for diplomatic posturing is over. Europe must take concrete action to reform its defence strategy or risk being unprepared for future threats.
9️⃣ Standing armies alone aren’t enough. Europe must expand reserve forces & modernize training programs to sustain a prolonged engagement if necessary. Europe needs a backbone of troops which can be mobilised to support the professional army, which also needs expansion.
8️⃣Current production levels of artillery shells, ATGMs & other key munitions are insufficient for a prolonged conflict. Manufacturing & logistics must scale up urgently. This has been demonstrated to be a key also by Russia which used most of its past Soviet stockpile.
7️⃣ Europe must develop long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to strengthen deterrence. Over-reliance on U.S. systems like HARM is unsustainable. In addition, also air-to-air missile platforms need to be procured within Europe to increase the resilience of the Armed Forces.
6️⃣ Europe relies heavily on U.S. systems like Patriots. More investment is needed in SAMP-T, IRIS-T, and CAMM systems. A significant increase in the production of these systems is mandatory. In addition, Europe could seek cooperation with South Korea, which has capable systems.
5️⃣If the U.S. reduces military aid, Europe must fill the gap. This means doubling annual bilateral contributions & exploring EU bonds to distribute costs. This should be a priority even if the US support would be only reduced, since it is an investment for Europe's security.
4️⃣ Denmark’s PM called for European nations to increase defence spending above NATO’s 2% GDP guideline potentially to 3% or more. A major shift is needed to modernize forces & increase readiness. Europe must focus on 5 key areas of defence preparedness. Let’s break them down.
3️⃣ For decades, Europe relied on the US-led NATO umbrella. But Trump’s signals of disengagement mean Europe must prepare for a future where American support is no longer unconditional. Europe's response will send a message to Beijing about Taiwan & the Indo-Pacific.
2️⃣ Leaders from Europe & beyond met in Kyiv to reaffirm support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, President Macron visited the WH and stressed that any negotiations must include Ukraine & avoid giving Russia a victory. But a surprising US vote at the UN signals shifting global dynamics.
1️⃣ Europe at a Crossroads Three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe faces a stark choice: build a stronger defence or risk being unprepared for future conflicts. A thread and article on @tochnyi on why this moment is crucial for European security. 🧵
Thanks to my friend Dasha efforts, we’re just £165 away from completing our fundraiser to support the 93rd Mechanized Brigade in acquiring an EW system. Let’s get this over the finish line! Donate here: www.paypal.com/pools/c/9cvx... Every contribution counts!
UPowerNation and I are fundraising for vehicle-mounted electronic warfare (EW) systems the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade "Kholodnyi Yar"! 🇺🇦 @dashamayer14.bsky.social and Oksana need the 800 GBP left, and I will help them in this task! If you can donate here: www.paypal.com/pools/c/9cvx...
5/ Would it lead to total collapse in six months? No. It would mean more Ukrainian soldiers and civilians killed, especially as air defense stocks deplete, but on the battlefield, there would be no sudden collapse, thus such claims are irresponsible.
A great article from my friend @edrotning.tochnyi.info at @tochnyi.info on why a Peacekeeping force is not the adequate instrument to guarantee peace and deter Russia.
It is only an algorithm made to let you think you are alone and make other fearful not to speak out, as in Nazi Germany. But you are not alone we are more and we will win
Thanks to all the @tochnyi.info team for their help and support, without which this research would not be possible and in particular thanks to @clockworkchris.bsky.social for the incredible work on the graphics.
11/11 I end this article with a conclusion written by my friend @jonathan.tochnyi.info , thank you for sharing and reading the thread and article:
10/n These and other plants covered in the article are just the tip of the iceberg, there is much more unseen. This is a clear sign that Russia is preparing for a larger conflict, not with Ukraine but with a weakened Europe.
9/n In Perm of particular relevance is the NPO Iskra plant near, close to the Perm Powder Plant (also in large expansion). Iskra produces key components for ballistic & intercontinental missiles, images reveal a systematic expansion since the war started.
8/n We have been investigated other sites: ▪️ Aleksinsky Chemical Plant (hit by 13 drones in Nov 2024) ▪️ Murom Instrument-Making Plant (produces ignition systems for missiles, expanding operations) ▪️ Kazan Plant of Precision Engineering (optics and aiming/vision systems)
7/n Bryansk Chemical Plant has seen increasing activities despite being recently hit by a Ukrainian strike, plays a key role in producing propellants for Grad, Uragan, Tornado-S, and TOS-1 Burattino systems.
6/n Some sites are rapidly expanding. The Tambov Powder Plant (+34% production since 2022) is hiring 3,000+ new workers & now under Rostec’s control. Satellite imagery shows extensive new construction and the expansion has been the subject of a recent visit by Medvedev.
5/n Ukraine, at the moment, can strike several plants and research centres using drones, but only a few with more heavy weapons if Europe would allow it. In addition, many of these facilities are close to the air defence umbrella of Moscow.
4/n Russia’s arms industry has adapted, using clandestine networks & foreign tech. Iran supplies drones, North Korea sends munitions, & China provides dual-use tech. Sanctions alone aren’t enough to cripple this war economy.
3/n As we enter the third year of the war, Russia’s defence industry is not just surviving but expanding despite sanctions. A growing authoritarian bloc which I call the "Axis of Tiranny" (Russia, Iran, North Korea, China) fuels its military machine.
2/n The entire article and analysis can be found here. In this thread, I will highlight some of the key aspects, but I strongly encourage you to read the complete work. tochnyi.info/2025/02/the-...
The Cost of Inaction: Russia’s Defence Industry Redevelopment 1/n At @tochnyi.info we have been working hard on this research, largely based on OSINT data analysis, to answer to a simple question. Is Russia re-arming already? The answer is yes.
www.clubhouse.com/room/L93cNwa...
🇺🇦🎙️Il open a Clubhouse room on Ukraine and the ridiculous ceasefire proposals from the US and Merz. It will be in an hour or so if there’s any interest clubhouse.com is the predecessor to Twitter Spaces
Will is a good friend of mine and a true activist and passionate leader. America needs 100 000 more of people like Will
Europe’s minimum theory of victory should be to demonstrate to Russia that no matter how long the war lasts, European support will sustain Ukraine’s resistance. As long as Ukraine is not left to fight alone, time works against Russia. 5/5
Europe defence is now and should be number one priority, there is no growth and prosperity in a continent under constant threat. Uk and EU must work harder, invest now to do not have to spend more later, is simple. But requires the ability to explain this to the people, not convince them, explain.
Will be there man
I think that Raegan is revolting in his grave.
I would encourage anyone interested in the war in Ukraine to follow my colleagues; this podcast always factually gives news, often after long revisions.
Nouvelle publication ! Depuis bientôt 3 ans, la guerre en Ukraine a été le théâtre d'un bouleversement : 𝗹𝗮 𝗱𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝘀𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗺𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗱𝘂 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗺𝗽 𝗱𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗲. Armes miracles ? Aviation du pauvre ? Confrontés à la prolifération de ces appareils, nous peinons à les évaluer. www.calameo.com/cesa/read/00...
unfortunately we had temporary damage to our transport. rear tire blew up, and needs repairs. but we will fix it and make sure this equipment gets to Ukrainian defenders asap. If you would like to support our efforts, here is a link to donate: www.paypal.com/donate?campa...
Forgot the receipt ahahah. Soon more picture from the boys!
Good news! With Oksana and @dashamayer14.bsky.social we collected and delivered the Ecoflow promised to the 54th Brigade, the second one 🔥. Soon we will have also some pictures. Thank you all! And if you like follow these two valiant ladies here or on X.
We are so close to finish this just 50 GBP and it is done!
bsky.app/profile/hart... 😉
End. Repeated targeting of key regions, such as Bryansk, Voronezh, and Saratov Oblast, suggests that Ukraine’s strategy is focused on regions critical to energy logistics, potentially forcing Russia to divert resources for repair and defence.
6. This escalation likely has a dual impact: immediate disruption of fuel supplies and longer-term degradation of Russia’s ability to sustain economically the war effort.
5. The peak in March 2024 highlights Ukraine's capacity to execute coordinated campaigns at crucial times.
4. The data indicates a notable rise in strikes over time, showcasing Ukraine's enhanced ability to disrupt Russian energy infrastructure. The transition from occasional attacks in 2022 to frequent operations in 2024 and 2025 illustrates a significant operational learning curve.
3. The escalation in attack frequency, the increasing reliance on drones, and the evolving focus on both depots and refineries highlight a deliberate and adaptive strategy aimed at undermining Russia’s energy logistics and industrial capacity.
2. The collected data and visual representation of strikes on Russian oil infrastructure provide valuable insights into the efficacy of Ukrainian operations targeting oil depots and refineries.
1. I would like to share here what many of you have already seen on X, a chart realised at @tochnyi.info based on all the UAV and non UAV strike on Russian oil infrastructure in occupied territories and Russia. This is only the tip of the iceberg of a much larger work in progress.
Yes and yes and. Again yes
In conclusion, Ukrainian drone strikes have evolved and can target various sites but still lack the firepower of missiles. Their long-range capabilities allow for deep strikes within Russia, and more advanced platforms are expected to emerge in 2025.
18. Russia has used drones and missiles against Ukraine, significantly impacting civilians while only partially damaging military infrastructure. The main goal has been to undermine Ukrainian morale. Despite losing electrical production, Ukraine persists, partly thanks to support from the EU.
17. Ukraine has demonstrated this capability many times, such as in Kursk, where they targeted substations and bridges when it was crucial for the ground situation. However, all the strikes discussed so far have a more strategic impact, aimed at wearing down Russia.
16. These strikes can be effective at the operational level, for example, if troops are approaching the front line and there is a need to delay their reinforcement, or if an operation is planned that requires disrupting the electrical supply.
15. Some argue that substations and bridges receive insufficient attention, and there's some truth to this. However, attacks on these structures usually cause limited damage that can be repaired quickly or addressed with alternative solutions.
14. In an attritional war, it's vital to deplete your enemy's resources, including construction materials for reinforcing and repairing facilities. For Ukraine, the costs of such actions are relatively low compared to the human costs if these facilities function at full capacity.
13. Targeting oil depots is an effective strategy for achieving immediate impacts by destroying fuel that would have been used to support the Russian mechanised army. Although the disruption may not be immediately noticeable to us, it is certainly felt at a logistical level.
