Make it clear that whether this ends in six months or in five years, it makes no difference to us. The only thing that will change from here on out is the Russian death toll. 3/3
Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, University of Oslo. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy. Weekly analysis of missile tech, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence 👇 https://missilematters.substack.com/subscribe
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Make it clear that whether this ends in six months or in five years, it makes no difference to us. The only thing that will change from here on out is the Russian death toll. 3/3
We have to tell the Russians every day that no matter how many people they are willing to sacrifice for nothing in Ukraine, Europe will stand by Ukraine and fund its resistance for as long as Ukraine chooses to fight, or until Russia is too exhausted to continue. 2/3
I could now go on about how it took 3.5 years to get here, and how much the previous German government, and partly this one, failed to realize this simple fact. But for now, let’s just be glad that the metaphorical floor of what must be done has finally been reached. 1/3
#Ukraine #Missile evolution 2014–2025 | @frhoffmann.bsky.social : - Adapt missiles to the war' need and scale the production throughput - Build independent strike capabilities (SCALP-EG were useful but too low quantity) - Junction of long range missiles with drones knowledge
Hi all, I just published my latest Substack post. With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs. Short summary below. missilematters.substack.com/p/ukraines-... 1/6
The three big question marks surrounding the Flamingo: scalability of production, survivability, and accuracy. Let’s see if higher-resolution pictures can provide some indication of how far the missile missed its likely nominal aimpoint.
Range is only one factor that determines use of projectile. If stated specifications are correct, the Flamingo is faster than any other Ukrainian long-range strike weapon currently in its arsenal (except ATACMS if there are still any left). It also has a significantly higher payload.
Interesting pieace from a leading expert on missiles👇 Is 'Flamingo' a marketing ploy distraction from a corruption investigation? Either way, #Ukraine has other options for long range strike capabilities. If exsternal funding can keep up, that is.
From what I heard, it was also just very easy to say no to Germany on this one, given the U212CD. Type-26 is "US light", given the American tech involved, so also not too bad from that perspective.
I'm waiting for higher res pictures before drawing conclusions.
Notice the framing; Russia and US on one side. Ukraine and Europe on the other. Dictatorship vs Democracy. This has been my main message for the entirety of Trump’s reign. Time to pick a side. It should be an easy choice to fight for Ukraine, Europe and Democracy.
If and when Ukraine succeeds in acquiring a mass-producible heavy missile system, the intensity and destructiveness of its missile war can be expected to increase. That said, cost will become an increasingly constraining factor, making foreign financing more important. 6/6
Given the recent news about Fire Point, the producer of the Flamingo, it is best to remain cautious about the missile’s prospects. Ukraine, however, retains other options, including the Hrim-2 SRBM/MRBM, the Korshun LACM, and the “Long Neptune” LACM, among others. 5/6
New efforts are now underway to complement this arsenal with a “heavy-hitter”: a missile system combining long range with high payload capacity and velocity. It is in this context that last week’s news about the Flamingo must be understood. 4/6
From relying almost entirely on Western partners in 2023 for long-range strike capabilities, Ukraine by 2025 fields a diverse but still imperfect missile arsenal, with lighter drones and mini-cruise missiles forming the backbone. 3/6
Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production. 2/6
Hi all, I just published my latest Substack post. With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs. Short summary below. missilematters.substack.com/p/ukraines-... 1/6
Der heutige Beitrag von @frhoffmann.bsky.social beschreibt die Flugkörperentwicklungen der Ukraine im Zeitraum 2014–2025 und analysiert den Aufstieg, die Rückschläge sowie die Zukunft der ukrainischen Deep-Strike-Fähigkeiten. www.hartpunkt.de/flugkoerpere...
Allereerst - een goede actie van meerdere Europese landen om samen met de VS duizenden goedkope kruisraketten aan te schaffen die de komende weken al arriveren in #Oekraïne, waar een groot tekort is aan lange afstandswapens. Maar toch… (1/4) www.twz.com/air/ukraine-...
And another missile story: @frhoffmann.bsky.social gave his assessment on whether the Ukrainian FP-5 ”Flamingo” missiles, introduced this month, can change the war.
Bro please bro, let's try arms control with Russia one last time bro. I swear it will work bro, just one more time. kyivindependent.com/trump-says-h...
The key issue for Neptune has been scaling production beyond a handful of missiles every few months. The question now is whether proper production lines can or have been established. 2/2
First picture of the "Long Neptune", a range-enhanced 1000-kilometer variant of the Neptune anti-ship cruise missile. Note the increased diameter in the midsection, likely for additional fuel, while the propulsion & warhead sections appear to remain unchanged compared to the baseline version. 1/2
No reason why European missile manufacturers couldn't have built such a system themselves, and no reason why European governments shouldn't have funded it. Now European funds leave the continent, and U.S. targeting restrictions will greatly reduce the impact. kyivindependent.com/us-approves-...
Hi all, I published my latest Substack post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications. Access the full post via the link below: missilematters.substack.com/p/the-flamin... Short summary below. 1/6
The assumption that Ukraine's conventional long-range strike campaign would not make a difference was always an extremely odd one. People arguing against it portrayed a fundamental lack of understanding of strategic airpower provided by modern conventional missiles.
Ukraine was a participant in the INF Treaty, which Russia played an instrumental role in undermining. Now Russia will be faced with hundreds, likely eventually thousands, of Ukrainian ground-launched intermediate-range missiles of the type that the INF Treaty banned.
A mass-produced deep strike weapon like the Flamingo is arguably one of Ukraine’s strongest security guarantee in a post-war European order, regardless of the war’s outcome and independent of European or American allies. 6/6
In my view, the question is not whether the FP-5 will get through, but how many. Beyond the immediate implications for the ongoing war, the Flamingo could mark the beginning of a credible Ukrainian conventional countervalue capability to deter future Russian aggression. 5/6
However, even a steady supply of 30 to 50 missiles per month would likely have a tangible effect on the war. This is especially true given that Russian air defenses have run thin, and the area requiring protection against Ukrainian missiles will only continue to expand. 4/6
The ultimate impact of the Flamingo on the battlefield will depend on Ukrainian production levels and its survivability against Russian missile defenses. Ukrainian output goals of more than 200 units per month by the end of the year are certainly ambitious. 3/6
The FP-5 Flamingo is the first "heavy" missile system in Ukraine's indigenous missile arsenal, combining long range with a large payload. This offers significant advantages in terms of missile lethality through improved warhead penetration and greater explosive yield. 2/6
Hi all, I published my latest Substack post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications. Access the full post via the link below: missilematters.substack.com/p/the-flamin... Short summary below. 1/6
The FP-5 #Flamingo Has Arrived: What Ukraine's 3,000-Kilometer Cruise Missile Means for the #War and the Future of #Europe: @frhoffmann.bsky.social substack.com/app-link/pos... #Ukraine #Putinswar #Russia #military
The FP-5 Flamingo Has Arrived: What Ukraine's 3,000-Kilometer Cruise Missile Means for the War and the Future of Europe Specifications, range, payload, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications. By @frhoffmann.bsky.social missilematters.substack.com/p/the-flamin...
Good overview of the capabilities and possibilities of Ukraine's new Flamingo missile by @frhoffmann.bsky.social.
@frhoffmann.bsky.social gibt einen Überblick über die Fähigkeiten und Möglichkeiten der FP-5 „Flamingo“ Rakete, welche die letzten Tagen Schlagzeilen gemacht hat.
A comprehensive assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo will be published tomorrow morning in my newsletter. I'll discuss the missile's characteristics and its implications for the war and Europe. Sign up her to receive it straight to your inbox. missilematters.substack.com/subscribe
A comprehensive assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo will be published tomorrow morning in my newsletter. I'll discuss the missile's characteristics and its implications for the war and Europe. Sign up her to receive it straight to your inbox. missilematters.substack.com/subscribe
2) Russia and its proxies in the West will insist that any peace deal must include Ukraine’s comprehensive disarmament in the missile domain (without of course having the same expectation for Russia). 4/4
So be prepared for two things: 1) Russia will beat the nuclear drums to pressure Western states into forcing Ukraine to call off strikes on Russian industry. 3/4
That is Ukraine’s strongest security guarantee. If it can field 3,000 to 5,000 of these (and similar) missiles, ready within 24 to 48 hours to destroy upward of 25% of Russia’s economic output, further Russian aggression becomes untenable. 2/4
I know much of the discussion focuses on the massive implications Flamingo’s mass production has for the ongoing war. But let's not overlook the major consequences Ukraine’s acquisition of a mass-produced heavy deep strike weapon will have for the post-war deterrence architecture. 1/4
Lavrov is literally performing standup comedy at this point.
They did not expect this level of German commitment to Ukraine’s missile industry. If the Russians were surprised and caught off guard, that is probably a good sign, and suggests the funding had an important political effect as well. 3/3
From a military perspective, however, Germany’s largescale financing of Ukrainian missile programs, now coming to light gradually, will have a far greater impact than supplying 50–100 Taurus. The reactions I have heard from the Russian side also suggest consternation and surprise on their end. 2/3
On thing to note is that the long-range strike issue is one area where the Merz government handled matters well. I am not a fan of the decision not to supply Taurus in the end, as the political signal would have been important. 1/3
Who would have guessed I end the day with such a high lmao.
Here is the thing: If a radar is pointed in the direction of this missile, it will light up the screen, no doubt. But that's a big if. Ukraine has penetrated Russian airspace 1,000+ km deep with converted two-seaters flying at 250 km/h. Russia cannot close all attack vectors, and Russia knows it.
Hi all, I published my latest Missile Matters newsletter earlier today, covering the Trump-Putin Summit in Alaska. My overall impression: Bad, but it could have been worse. You can access the peice via the link below. Short summary below. 1/5 missilematters.substack.com/p/security-...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bfnj...
Reported specifications (treat with caution as not yet verified in any way):
So, apparently a new Ukrainian cruise missile has entered the chat. 3,000+ km range, 1,000 kg payload capacity. That's the long-range, heavy-hitter Ukraine has been waiting for. The fact that this leaked today is unlikely to be a coincidence.
An excellent detailed analysis from Fabian Hoffman. (Extract attached)
After all, as the only European power that has invaded its neighbors three times in the past 17 years, what steps is Russia prepared to make to reassure European NATO states of its non-hostile intentions? 2/2
If Putin is adament in settling the war in Ukraine with a broader European agreement, European governments should turn the demand back on Moscow and present a list of expected concessions. 1/2
This is unfortunate, because Russia's war economy is the source of untapped pressure points that Europe, ideally alongside the United States, can and should do much more to undermine it. This may not create a sudden collapse, but will accelerate the downward trend. 5/5
For Europe, the basic outlook has not changed in my view. Tangible progress toward a just peace deal requires applying pressure effectively and offering Ukraine credible security guarantees. On both fronts, Europe still falls short. 4/5
What’s good: The meeting did not show the deep level of overt alignment that many, myself included, had feared. That said, it is now up to European decisionmakers to pull Trump back and restore the narrative around sanctions and pressure. 3/5
What’s bad: Trump’s explicit acceptance of the idea that the war in Ukraine should be settled as part of a broader deal on Europe. Such a deal is neither feasible nor appropriate unless and until Russia stops the killing in Europe. 2/5
Hi all, I published my latest Missile Matters newsletter earlier today, covering the Trump-Putin Summit in Alaska. My overall impression: Bad, but it could have been worse. You can access the peice via the link below. Short summary below. 1/5 missilematters.substack.com/p/security-...
Previous Taurus production capacity was likely around 50 to 100 units annually, so a substantial increase beyond the earlier maximum would be necessary. 5/5
To add: It all depends, of course, on when MBDA Germany, Saab, and their subcontractors can deliver, but I assume deliveries would not begin before 2029. This means that unless production capacity exceeds 200 units per year, the order would likely not be completed before 2035. 4/5
The obvious question of course is why it will have taken nearly four years to reach this point. Those missiles could already be rolling off the production line had German decisionmakers acted decisively in 2022/2023. 3/3
Including the 600 existing Taurus KEPD 350, 75 JASSM-ER, and roughly 200 JSM, an order of about 1,000 missiles would pretty much meet this need. Combined with a likely RCM² order, this would finally put Germany on a path toward an at least moderately robust long-range strike capability. 2/3
New reporting by @hartpunkt.bsky.social points to a “substantial” Taurus order expected by late 2025/early 2026. A four-digit order would make sense, as I have been told the German Air Force has a requirement of at least 2,000 Taurus-like missile systems. www.hartpunkt.de/bundeswehr-w... 1/3
That means he's going to wing it (plus ça change).
Would we be having the same discussion if the US had deployed Tomahawk CMs on a ground-mobile launcher in 2014, but claimed the range was magically below the theoretical maximum simply because it hadn’t tested them beyond 500 km? It would have been just as preposterous then as this is now. 5/5
So once more: we can absolutely determine who is right and wrong when it comes to the 9M729. While calculating the exact range is difficult, it is clear that Russia had explaining to do, and it simply could not or would not provide it. 4/5 bsky.app/profile/kady...
For GLCMs, maximum range is much simpler to determine, as it is almost entirely a function of engine efficiency and fuel load. No intrusive testing is needed to establish this, as I, and others before me, have demonstrated. 3/5
The fact that GLBM range capability was determined by the range at which the missile was tested is an unfortunate aspect of the treaty, but understandable. Neither side was willing to accept the intrusive inspections that would have been required to verify the theoretical range of GLBMs. 2/5
I'm sorry, but the arguments in this thread make no sense. "While the wording differs, in both cases the underlying criterion is the missile’s tested capability". If the negotiators had wanted the same criterion for GLBMs and GLCMs, they could have easily written it that way. 1/5
This experience now needs to be scaled and applied to other sectors, especially missiles. Some comments from on this in the article. 2/2
Excellent research by @lauramdubois.ft.com and @chriscook.news in the Financial Times this morning. The key point: if you fund defense industries, they are more likely to expand. The ASAP program has demonstrably increased artillery shell production in Europe. www.ft.com/content/ce61... 1/2
Lack of velocity is a fundamental limitation of the interceptor drone concept. It significantly reduces the window of opportunity for a successful intercept and makes evasive maneuvers easier, as the interceptor's no-escape zone is inherently constrained.
Forgot to add: In my case I also was quite generous with "cutting away" fuel tank for the foldable wings. In reality, and with appropriate silicon tanks, it's probably much less space that is lost.
Interesting post by @frhoffmann.bsky.social My own ball-park calculations on the subject: let's take Tomahawk 1,600 km range-optimized version and try to estimate its range at very low altitude for the duration of the flight. 1/3 bsky.app/profile/frho...
In the case of the 9M729, the fact that it's probably some 0.5m or more longer, providing significantly more fuel space, further increases robustness. Again, my analysis is not about predictnig the exact range. But it's clear that Russia had some explaining to do, which it couldn't. 3/3
I think one reason why my analysis, as well as yours, is very robust is because SFCs of ~0.7 are consistent for the types of Turbofan engines that US and Russia have access to. So while it's useful to vary that for robustness purposes, SFCs >.8 are probably not a realistic assumption. 2/x
Helpful analysis, thanks! Tomahawk, as well as similar cruise missiles, likely wouldn't fly a ground-hugging trajectory for their entire flight. A standard trajectory would probably assume that at least 20-50% of the flight are at cruising altitude, with much higher L/Ds. 1/x
The graphic is a direct reproduction of Russia’s claim. Do you think a graphic designer arrived at that by chance? In any case, Sputnik’s exact relationship to the state is irrelevant. It does nothing to the validity of the technical argument. Perhaps it’s time to engage with that instead.
Hi all, I published my latest newsletter earlier, where I provide a technical analysis of the 9M729 to show that even without access to classified information it's clear that Russia has been lying. Access the post via this link: missilematters.substack.com/p/the-morat... Short summary below. 1/7
Here's Hoffmann's debunking of the Russian claim that it was US/NATO's fault the INF collapsed. It was - of cource - Russia's fault all along. #Russia #US #Europe #NATO
A point that rightly loomed large in earlier discussions about a potential U.S.-imposed Ukraine deal was the central role of security guarantees. There is far less focus on this now, with most attention on territorial concessions. In my view, however, that is really only of secondary importance.
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty in 2019, after years of Russian noncompliance, was therefore entirely correct. Likewise, refusing to engage with Russia on its moratorium proposal has been the only reasonable course of action. 7/7
Russia has not credibly demonstrated that either of these conditions applies. Therefore, the only prudent conclusion is that the missile’s range greatly exceeds the INF limits. 6/7
This analysis is robust. In fact, the only way the missile’s range would remain below the 500-kilometer threshold is if it carried a very small fuel tank relative to its overall size and/or if its efficient turbofan engine were replaced with a much less efficient turbojet. 5/7
My analysis suggests that a conservative estimate of the 9M729’s characteristics, particularly the size of its fuel tank, indicates a range of 1,400 to 1,700 kilometers, well above the 500-kilometer limit. 4/7
Russia has vehemently denied this, but even using open-source information, including the diameter and length figures Russia has itself provided, it is clear that something is deeply amiss with the missile. 3/7
Russia has announced it will no longer abide by its self-imposed INF moratorium. Of course, it was never in a position to credibly claim adherence in the first place, given its continued deployment of the 9M729 cruise missile, which exceeds the INF range limits. 2/7
Hi all, I published my latest newsletter earlier, where I provide a technical analysis of the 9M729 to show that even without access to classified information it's clear that Russia has been lying. Access the post via this link: missilematters.substack.com/p/the-morat... Short summary below. 1/7
Was probably a much bigger problem in the past. Today we know Russia has mastered turbofan technology, silicon fuel tanks, and JP-10 equivalent fuel. That wasn't the case back then and there was more uncertainty about the technological sophistication.
Interesting analysis by @frhoffmann.bsky.social, estimating the size of the fuel tank and range of Russia's INF Treaty-busting 9M729 cruise missile. 1,728 km is actually a bit lower than the often-quoted 2,000-2,500 km, but surpasses INF's 500 km by a long way. open.substack.com/pub/missilem...
Thanks! It's because I'm quite conservative in my initial estimates. As I stated, the missile is likely longer than the 6.73 meters, somewhere around 7-8 meters. I'm also quite generous in "cutting away" fuel tank for the foldable wings. In reality, they probably take less space.
More about russian "Wunderwaffen" , #INF and Desinformation: missilematters.substack.com/p/the-morato...
Even if you’re not into missile tech and long range capability questions, this episode of our Substack live is worth watching as our guest @frhoffmann.bsky.social had himself a special guest: a cute cat who almost stole the show ! 😼
Hello All, @alanderminna.bsky.social and I were joined by @frhoffmann.bsky.social just a little while ago for a substack live. Everything you need to know about Ukrainian and Russian ranged weapons and strategies. r=1tgexa&utm_medium=ios
More details will follow in tomorrow’s Substack post. If you’re interested, you can sign up via the link below: missilematters.substack.com/subscribe 6/6
Who's wrong over the collapse of the INF treaty is clearly not a “he said, she said” situation. The Americans may have tracked the tests and collected satellite imagery and telemetry data, but even from open sources it is clear that something is amiss on the Russian side. 5/6
